Determinets Foreign Policy Part 2

Pakistan joined the defense pacts with the United States in the past largely to protect her frontiers against possible aggression from India. Even in the present-day scenario the 70 per cent GNP which is being spent on defense sector is only because the country cannot afford to IE India play with her territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

Pakistan arid Afghanistan have a common frontier of about 1200 miles. After the creation of Pakistan, the successive Afghan Governments with the backing of India and Russia decried the validity of this border on ethnic grounds and laid claim to a big chunk of Pakistan territory and had fanned and supported the Pukhtonistan idea in more than one way. Later in December 1979 when the form Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan, this border became highly vulnerable and Pakistan was forced to seek Western and American assistance for making her defense impregnable against a super-power. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, that country was plunged into a protracted civil war. With the disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of new Central Asian States, Pakistan looked forward to unique economic opportunities, but the civil war in Afghanistan became a major snag in developing economic and trade relations between Pakistan and Central Asian States. All the easily accessible land routes to these states pass through Afghanistan which can only be functional when peace is restored in that country. These land routes are identified along the following main arteries: (i) Chaman, Qindar, Hert, Turghundi, Kushka (in Turkmenistan across Afghan border) (ii) Chaman, Qindar, Herat, Mazar Sharif, Termez (Uzbekistan) (iii) Peshawar, Jalalabad, KabuI, Termez.

Pakistan shares about 590 miles of a common frontier with Iran. Almost without exception, Pakistan has enjoyed very cordial relations with Iran since its inception in 1947. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan as an independent state. In the time of need, Iran came out with strong moral and material support for Pakistan. The close and warm ties between the two countries have been expressed through their association in CENTO and RCD and the presently formed ECO. The Pakistani decision makers attached great importance to developing close friendly relations with Iran from the very outset.

China and Pakistan have a common frontier of about 400 miles between Xian Jiang and northern areas of Pakistan. China is a big power and close relations with this mighty neighbor have become a cornerstone of our foreign policy. China is the only world Dower that has never let Pakistan down.

Pakistan is also very close to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden areas which are the main source of oil supply to the West. Its location at the head of the Arabian Sea (the trade route via the Suez Canal between Europe and Asia) have a significant importance the United States for its strategic interests in the region. The decision makers of Pakistan’s foreign policy are fully conscious of it d have not failed to use its importance to the country’s advantage.

Other elements of geo-politics, size and population also “have their bearing on Pakistan’s foreign policy. Among the Muslim countries and other Asian countries only a few are bigger Pakistan in terms of size and population. This partly explains why Pakistan is not prepared to accept an inferior position in international affairs. The arid and semi-arid climate of Pakistan along with the ethnic characteristics produce a healthy and well built population in the country whom the British have often chosen to call a martial race. The land of Pakistan is fertile with adequate irrigation facilities under the Indus River system. Some valuable mineral resources are also available such as gypsum, rock salt, limestone, crude oil, coal, chromite, sulphur, iron and natural gas. There is also not much imbalance in its import-export ratio which characterises most of the third world countries. All this provides Pakistan base of a medium range power and encourages its decision makers to play an important rote for Pakistan in world affairs. From the day of independence, Pakistan was involved in a bitter and prolonged struggle for her very existence survival. Its strategic environment has been largely conditioned by its perception of a security threat from India. The two nations have fought three wars (1948, 1965 and 1971) within the last five decades and experienced countless border clashes. To obviate any threat from India, Pakistan’s security planners, in defense terms, have been constantly engaged in search for a near parity situation with India. A ceaseless effort to improve and expand Pakistan’s military machine in order to search and maintain a relative panty has been undertaken by all the governments.

This was followed by a communal holocaust and mass migration, India’s refusal to give Pakistan its due share of arms and financial assets. India’s violent take-over of Junagarh a d Hyderabad, the stoppage of river water flowing into Pakistan etc. The Indo-Pakistan enmity as a matter of tact, is rooted in history. Both regard the partition of India as a tragic blunder, each attributing its own explanation to it. The Hindus are looking forward to a day when India will be united under them as legendary Mahabharata. The Muslims see in it a toss to their political hold on the subcontinent, firstly, on account of the British highhandedness and secondly, because of fraudulent stratagems of the Hindus to corner them within the subcontinent. To a Pakistani, an Indian is his arch enemy, always hatching plans to undo his existence. To an ordinary Indian the agreement to allow Pakistan to come into being was a tragic blunder which needs rectification. The Indian hegemonic role over the subsequent years further strengthened this mistrust in the minds of the intelligentsia in Pakistan.

India is militarily almost ten .times as strong as Pakistan but Pakistan’s basic aim is to offset India’s military superiority and mobilize world opinion in order to compel India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. Hence, Kashmir is a touchstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy and Pakistan tends to judge its international friends and foes by the measuring rod of the Kashmir question. However, relations with India have been very complicated: ‘There are a complex of social religious, historical, political and psychological tore all in a sinister combination to antagonize the two states.” The fixation on India has in fact largely shaped Pakistan’s relations with and attitude towards other countries. President Ayub Khan argued: We have an enemy, an implacable enemy in India” nc1 he ref erred to “India’s ambitions to absorb Pakistan and turn her into a satellite.” Consequently, Pakistan’s foreign policy was shaped in a defensive mold from the earlier days of independence, which urged it to look for security arrangements elsewhere. Thus Pakistan found itself placed in a camp opposite to India. Both China and the West under this programme find a significant place in Pakistan’s security plan.

Few states were born as poor as Pakistan in 1947. The Muslim minority of India occupied the north-western highland and the eastern rim land of India. Industrially these areas did not figure anywhere on the map of the subcontinent. Pre-partition industrial and commercial growth was associated with Calcutta, Bombay and Madras which form part of new India. On the reverse, there was very little industry in the areas that were to become Pakistan. Thus the new state of Pakistan was confronted with a multitude of socioeconomic and political problems and looked for foreign assistance aid loans in her struggle for economic and political survival. The first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to America in 1950 was actuated by the same considerations.

The American economic aid to Pakistan started in fiscal year 1951 and it gradually began to increase after signing by Pakistan of mutual security assistance agreement and its participation in the SEATO and CENTO (Baghdad Pact) in 1954 and 1955 respectively: This aid factor is very strong in shaping our foreign policy even today.

More than fifty four years have elapsed since the evolution of policy pursued by Pakistan in dealing with nations abroad. It has, during the course of this period, seen both the fruit and the bruises of it, yet it is clinging on to the spirit it imbibed at an early stage of its formation. There has been little substantive change in its overall international performance or outlook. All the aforesaid factors and forces lie at the root constitute the determinants of Pakistan’s foreign policy and in this entire India factor is the most important.